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“THE IMPORTANCE OF OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS” ON GAYS IN THE
MILITARY: A RESPONSE TO ELAINE DONNELLY’S CONSTRUCTING THE
CO-ED MILITARY1
JEANNE SCHEPER*
NATHANIEL FRANK**
AARON BELKIN***
GARY J. GATES ****
On February 28, 2007, former Rep. Martin Meehan (D-MA) and a bipartisan
group of co-sponsors reintroduced the Military Readiness Enhancement Act in
the House of Representatives to amend title 10 United States Code § 654 (“Policy
Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces”) to enhance the readiness of
the Armed Forces by replacing the current “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy with a
policy of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In the recent
DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW AND POLICY article, “Constructing the Co-Ed
Military,” Elaine Donnelly, president of the Center for Military Readiness,
asserts that “nothing has changed that would justify the turmoil that would
occur in and outside of Congress if Meehan’s legislation were seriously
2
considered or passed.” But on what evidence is she basing her claims that
turmoil would ensue if 10 U.S.C § 654, the ban on openly gay service members,
were repealed?

1. Elaine Donnelly, Constructing the Co-Ed Military, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 815, 816
(2007) [hereinafter Donnelly]. The title of the first subsection of Elaine Donnelly’s article is “The
Importance of Objective Analysis.” In the following response we address Donnelly on precisely this
point.
* Dr. Jeanne Scheper is Research Director of the Palm Center and an affiliated research scholar
in Women’s Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara.
** Dr. Nathaniel Frank is Senior Research Fellow at the Palm Center, University of California,
Santa Barbara, and teaches on the adjunct faculty at New York University. His scholarship and
writing on gays in the military and other topics have appeared in the New York Times, Washington
Post, The New Republic, Los Angeles Times, Newsday, Slate and others, and he has been interviewed on
major television and radio programs. His book, UNFRIENDLY FIRE: HOW THE GAY BAN UNDERMINES
THE MILITARY AND WEAKENS AMERICA, will be published by St. Martin’s Press in 2009.
*** Dr. Aaron Belkin is Director of the Palm Center and an Associate Professor of Political
Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara.
**** Dr. Gary J. Gates is a Senior Research Fellow at the Williams Institute, University of
California, Los Angeles School of Law. His research focuses on the geographic, demographic, and
economic characteristics of the lesbian and gay population.
2. Id. at 915.
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The outcomes of repeal are exactly the points that an informed public
conversation about the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy should be engaging, but in a
serious, evidence-based debate. And the focus of that debate should be not on
fears of what would “occur in and outside of Congress,” but on the impact of
any legislation on military readiness. Signed into law in November of 1993 by
President Clinton, the Defense Department issued the first set of comprehensive
regulations in February of 1994. The “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, once
considered an interim measure by policy makers, has remained in force,
3
relatively unchanged, for over fourteen years.
Contrary to Donnelly’s assertion, however, much has changed in the
military, political, and cultural landscape since 1993. Military opinion and
public opinion have experienced dramatic shifts, which have been well
documented by scholarly research and in the media. The most recent evidence
of these shifts, and perhaps the most telling, was a statement released by a
group of twenty-eight retired U.S. generals and admirals urging Congress to
4
repeal the current ban on openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual troops. The support
of such a large number of senior military officers for an end to the so-called gay
ban reflects nothing less than a sea change in military opinion on the issue. In
1993, when the current policy was formulated, some surveys found that 97
5
percent of generals and admirals opposed lifting the ban. When General John
Shalikashvili, who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993
through 1997, published an op-ed in The New York Times on January 2, 2007
calling for the end of “don’t ask, don’t tell,” he cited polls showing that a large
number of younger enlisted personnel also favor letting openly gay soldiers
6
serve. That poll of 545 troops who served in Afghanistan and Iraq by Zogby
International, found that 72 percent of service members are personally
7
comfortable interacting with gays and lesbians. Public opinion polls show
similarly strong indicators of change. Furthermore, data indicate that the policy
is now harming the military’s reputation because it is out of step with public
8
opinion.
Donnelly contests all of this evidence. She says that the research
supporting the claim that discrimination undermines the military, and that

3. “I would not say that the policy that we are implementing here today is the policy that will
be forever,” or also, “I would not say that this is gonna be it forever.” Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin, News Conference with Jamie Gorelick, General Counsel, Department of Defense, Regarding
the Regulations on Homosexual Conduct in the Military (Dec. 22, 1993).
4. Thom Shanker and Patrick Healy, A New Push to Roll Back ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2007.
5. Press Release, The Palm Center, Twenty-Eight Generals and Admirals Call for End to
Military’s Gay Ban (Nov. 29, 2007), http://www.palmcenter.org/press/dadt/releases/
twenty_eight_generals_and_admirals_call_for_end_to_militarys_gay_ban_0.
6. John M. Shalikashvili, Editorial, Second Thoughts on Gays in the Military, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
2007, §A, at 17.
7. Sam Rodgers, Opinions of Military Personnel on Sexual Minorities in the Military, Zogby
International, Dec. 2006. Zogby reported both 72% and 73% at different times. The discrepancy is
attributable to the use of two different rounding methods, both of which are considered legitimate
ways of deriving final figures from raw numbers.
8. See Aaron Belkin, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Does the Gay Ban Undermine the Military’s
Reputation?, 34 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 276 (2008) [hereinafter Belkin, Don’t Ask].
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integration would enhance military effectiveness, is not compelling. And she
suggests that, “A closer look at materials produced by the activist groups
9
usually reveals questionable methodology and unsupported conclusions.” The
Palm Center, a research institute at the University of California, Santa Barbara,
stands at the core of her offensive against full integration of openly gay and
lesbian service members. She repeatedly attempts to dismiss the credibility of
the Palm Center’s research by labeling our data the product of “social
10
engineers” and “activists.”
In the following pages, we respond to the substance of Donnelly’s critique,
addressing the factual errors in her analysis, addressing her unsupported
assertions about the quality and integrity of research in this area, in particular
by the Palm Center, and commenting on the stakes raised by the rhetoric
Donnelly chooses to deploy in presenting her position in lieu of evidence to
11
support that position. An analysis of the substance of her complaints shows
that her critique is without merit, that the methodologies behind the studies she
cites are in fact sound, and that the data show that discrimination compromises
military effectiveness, while integration enhances it. We agree with one aspect
of Donnelly’s argument: when lives and national security are at risk, basic
assumptions must be challenged and objective analysis is at a premium. And
that is the place from which the Palm Center approaches our research.
THE CENSUS KNOWS: ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF GAY AND LESBIAN SERVICE
MEMBERS
One of the basic questions that inform public conversation about “don’t
ask, don’t tell” involves the number of gays and lesbians serving in the armed
forces. Some commentators have suggested that ten percent of the American
12
public is gay or lesbian , and have applied this figure to the military, suggesting
that ten percent of the armed forces, or 250,000 troops, may be gay.
Unfortunately, the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy itself precludes conducting a
survey of active-duty military personnel that asks respondents about their
sexual orientation or behavior. As a result, scholars have had to consider other
approaches and methods to try to identify this otherwise hidden population of
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals serving in the United States armed forces. In
2004, Dr. Gary Gates of the Urban Institute published a study which found that
13
approximately 65,000 currently-serving troops are gay.
Donnelly attacks
Gates’ study, which she says amounts to “urban legend” rather than “a serious

9. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 916.
10. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 918, 938.
11. “We” refers to the authors, three of whom (Belkin, Frank, and Scheper) are Palm Center
staff and one of whom (Gates) is affiliated with the Williams Institute at the University of California,
Los Angeles School of Law and is also the author of research critiqued in Donnelly’s article.
12. ALFRED KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (W.B. Saunders Co. 1949) (1948).
13. Gary J. Gates, Gay Men and Lesbians in the U.S. Military: Estimates from Census 2000, THE
URBAN INSTITUTE, Sep. 28 2004, at 4, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411069_Gay
LesbianMilitary.pdf.
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piece of scholarship,” but virtually every assertion Donnelly makes in
describing the study is incorrect.
Donnelly’s first incorrect assertion is that the Urban Institute analysis
includes a “speculative claim” that in the U.S. four percent of men and three
15
percent of women are lesbian or gay. In fact, findings from a study published
after the Urban Institute study suggest that these figures actually underestimate
the fraction of lesbian, gay, and bisexual identified men and women in the
16
United States. A federally-funded nationally representative survey of men and
women aged 18-44 found that 4.1 percent of both men and women self17
identified as either “homosexual” or “bisexual.” This suggests that the Urban
Institute study likely underestimates the size of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual
population.
Donnelly continues with a claim that the study “speculated that household18
mates of the same-sex are homosexual.” The fact that same-sex “unmarried
partners” identified in the U.S. Census are likely lesbian and gay couples is not
speculation. To begin with, the same-sex couples identified in the U.S. Census
19
are not simply “household-mates” as the author suggests. Rather, they are
same-sex couples in which one partner is explicitly identified as either the
20
“husband/wife” or “unmarried partner” of the other partner. Therefore, those
identified as “roommates,” “boarders,” and “unrelated adults” are not included
among these couples. Nor are any same-sex couples with blood relationships
such as siblings, cousins, or children. Social scientists and government officials
have closely considered this question of categorization and are in broad
agreement that same-sex “unmarried partner” couples identified in the Census
21
are indeed lesbian and gay couples.

14. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 924.
15. Id.
16. William D. Mosher et al., 2005. Sexual Behavior and Selected Health Measures: Men and Women
15–44 Years of Age, United States, 2002 362. ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS 1.
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005)
[hereinafter Mosher et al.].
17. Id. at 3.
18. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 924.
19. Id.
20. U.S. Census 2000 Long Form D-2, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d02p.pdf.
21. See Marieka M. Klawitter & Victor Flatt, The Effects of State and Local Antidiscrimination
Policies on Earnings for Gays and Lesbians, 17 J. OF POL’Y ANALYS. AND MGMT. 658–86 (1998)
[hereinafter Klawitter & Flatt]; Black et al., Demographics of the Gay and Lesbian Population in the United
States: Evidence from Available Systematic Data Sources, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 139–54 (2000) [hereinafter
Black]; Sylvia A. Allegretto & Michelle M. Arthur, An Empirical Analysis of Homosexual/Heterosexual
Male Earnings Differentials: Unmarried and Unequal? 54 INDUS. & LAB.REL. REV. 631–46 (2001)
[hereinafter Allegretto & Arthur]; Lisa K. Jepsen & Christopher A. Jepsen, An Empirical Analysis of the
Matching Patterns of Same-Sex and Opposite-Sex Couples, 39 DEMOGRAPHY 435–53 (2002) [hereinafter
Jepsen & Jepsen]; Dan Black; Gary Gates; Seth Sanders; Lowell Taylor, Why Do Gay Men Live in San
Francisco?, 51 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS, (2002) 54–76; Gary J. Gates & Jason Ost, THE GAY AND
LESBIAN ATLAS, (Urban Institute Press, 2004); THE POTENTIAL BUDGETARY IMPACT OF RECOGNIZING
SAME-SEX MARRIAGES (Congressional Budget Office 2004); Gary J. Gates & Randall L. Sell, Measuring
Gay and Lesbian Couples, in THE HANDBOOK OF MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN FAMILY RESEARCH (Sandra L.
Hofferth & Lynne M. Casper eds., Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 2006) [hereinafter Gates & Sell]; Patrick
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In the specific case of military service, same-sex couples appear to be a
reasonable proxy for the broader lesbian, gay, and bisexual population. Black
and colleagues compare military service rates among same-sex couples in the
Census to men and women in the General Social Survey (a nationally
representative sample of adults) who indicate that they have had exclusively
22
same-sex sexual partners in the last five years. The estimates, it turns out, are
virtually the same.
Donnelly incorrectly states that the analyses are based on the fraction of
23
individuals in same-sex couples who identify as “veterans.”
In fact, the
estimates for the number of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals in the military are
based on the fraction of individuals in same-sex couples who indicate that they
are on active duty in the military and, separately, on those who indicate that
they are in the ready reserve forces (National Guard and Reserve). The report
uses these figures to estimate the number of lesbian, gay men, and bisexuals on
active duty and in the ready reserve. The analyses also separately consider the
number of lesbian, gay, and bisexuals who are veterans using only those in
same-sex couples who state that they have prior military service.
Finally, Donnelly claims that the Urban Institute report uses “questionable
24
methodology.” In fact, the report uses well-known statistical procedures and
conservative assumptions to reach its conclusions. The primary statistical
analyses use Bayes’ Rule, a common procedure frequently used by statisticians.
To estimate the size of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual population currently
serving in the military using Bayes’ Rule, the analyses rely on two key
assumptions, both of which err on the side of a conservative estimate:
1. Four percent of men and three percent of women in the U.S. population
are lesbian, gay, or bisexual. As already stated, Mosher et al. (2005)
25
find that 4.1 percent of both men and women identify as such.
2. The fraction of individuals in same-sex couples who report being on
active duty or in the ready reserve is the same as the fraction of all
lesbian, gay men, and bisexuals serving in the military. As the report
clearly states, this likely underestimates the latter as it seems
reasonable to believe that single lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals can
more easily serve and hide their sexual orientation (as the “don’t ask,
don’t tell” policy dictates) than can their coupled counterparts. As
such, the statistic derived from same-sex couples likely underestimates
the real fraction of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals presently serving
in the military.
Far from “urban legend,” the Urban Institute study is based on highquality data, sound statistical techniques, and conservative assumptions. The
Festy, Enumerating Same-Sex Couples in Censuses and Population Registers, 17.12 DEMOGRAPHIC
RESEARCH, 339–68 (2007); Lisa K. Jepsen, Comparing the Earnings of Cohabiting Lesbians, Cohabiting
Heterosexual Women, and Married Women: Evidence from the 2000 Census, 46 INDUS. REL. 699–727 (2007)
[hereinafter Jepsen]; Dan Black, Seth Sanders, Lowell Taylor, The Economics of Lesbian and Gay
Families 21 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 53–70 (2007).
22. Black, supra note 21.
23. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 924.
24. Id. at 923.
25. Mosher et al., supra note 16.
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report offers a credible estimate for the size of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual
population serving in the U.S. military: an estimated 65,000 active and reserve
26
military members are currently serving.
THE COST OF FIRING GAYS AND LESBIANS
What is the financial cost of firing gays and lesbians from the military? In
February 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report
that found that during its first ten years, the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy cost
27
$190.5 million to implement.
The Palm Center organized a Blue Ribbon
Commission to study the GAO’s report, and the Commission included
distinguished experts including professors at military universities, a retired U.S.
Army Colonel with a Ph.D. in economics, and a former Secretary of Defense.
The Commission’s work was vetted by an accounting professor from the Naval
Postgraduate School.
The Commission found that the GAO’s findings were based on
questionable data and methodology, and determined that the GAO’s errors led
to both over- and under-estimations of the total cost of implementing “don’t ask,
don’t tell.” When the over- and under-estimations were reconciled, it was
determined that the GAO’s overall estimate was 91 percent too low, and that the
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy cost the Pentagon at least $363.8 million to
28
implement during its first ten years.
Because the Commission used
conservative assumptions, it argued that its finding should be seen as a lower29
bound estimate.
Donnelly questions the Commission’s findings on two grounds. First, she
says, the issue is not the cost of implementing “don’t ask, don’t tell.” Rather, she
claims, “It is the cost of recruiting and training individuals who are not eligible
30
to serve in the military because they are homosexual.” She argues, “losses
related to the homosexual conduct law, whatever it is, could be reduced to nearzero if all potential recruits were fully and accurately notified that the 1993 law
31
means that homosexuals are not eligible to serve.” The flaw in Donnelly’s
reasoning, however, is that even if “don’t ask, don’t tell” were interpreted, as
she would have it, to prohibit all gays and lesbians from serving (which we
show below it does not), the financial cost of the policy would still be large.
From the 1940s until 1993, gays and lesbians were prohibited from serving as a
result of a complete and outright ban, and during this time the military fired
26. On social science estimates and methods for analyzing gay and lesbian populations, see
Allegretto & Arthur, supra note 21, Dan A. Black et al., The Economics of Lesbian and Gay Families, 21 J.
OF ECON. PERSP. 53 (2007), Dan A. Black et al., Why Do Gay Men Live in San Francisco? 51 J. OF URB.
ECON. 54 (2007). Enumerating Same-Sex Couples in Censuses and Population Registers, 17 DEMOG. RES.
339; Gates & Ost, supra note 21; Gates & Sell, supra note 21; Jepsen & Jepsen, supra note 21; Jepsen,
supra note 21; Klawitter & Flatt, supra note 21; Mosher et al., supra note 16.
27. Josh White, ‘Don’t Ask’ Costs More Than Expected, WASHINGTON Post, Feb. 14, 2006, at A04.
28. Id. at, at 8.
29. Memorandum from Aaron Belkin, to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Differing Results of GAO
and Blue Ribbon Commission Studies (Sept. 25, 2006) available at http://www.palmcenter.org/files/
active/0/20060925_ReplyGAOcritique.pdf.
30. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 920.
31. Id.
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32

approximately 2,000 people each year for being gay. (Approximately 1,000 per
33
year have been fired under “don’t ask, don’t tell.”)
Hence, even under a
complete and total ban, the financial cost of firing gays and lesbians would be as
high or higher than it is under “don’t ask, don’t tell.”
Second, Donnelly questions the Blue Ribbon Commission’s findings and
defends the GAO’s original report by noting that the GAO “‘stood by’” its
34
original analysis even after the Blue Ribbon Commission had critiqued it. It is
correct that the GAO “stood by” its original report, but this does not mean that
its original report was sound. As the Blue Ribbon Commission first explained in
its report, and then reiterated in an analysis of the GAO’s defense by Blue
Ribbon Commission Chair Aaron Belkin, the GAO misrepresented a critical
35
piece of cost-of-training data that led to a $150 million dollar error. In previous
GAO studies, and as is widely reported throughout the military manpower /
personnel literature, the cost to train one enlisted service member,
36
conservatively, was approximately $25,000 to $30,000 in the 1990s.
In its
original report, however, the GAO contradicted its own prior studies and
37
reported that it cost only $6,400 for the Army to train one soldier. By using
inaccurate data to estimate the cost of training enlisted personnel who were
subsequently fired for being gay or lesbian, the GAO missed approximately
$150 million of costs. Donnelly and the GAO can only stand behind the original
GAO study if they believe that it cost $6,400 to train one soldier in the 1990s.
This figure, however, is not supported in the literature, and seems particularly
off-target when one considers, as the Commission found, that service members
fired for being gay received, on average, more initial skill and mid-career
training than other members of the military.
WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE FROM FOREIGN MILITARIES
One central question in the U.S. debate over gays and lesbians in the
military is whether cohesion, readiness, morale, and recruiting have suffered in
foreign military forces that have lifted their gay bans. According to some social
scientists, foreign military experiences provide an opportunity for assessing the
plausibility of the claim that if the American ban were to be lifted, the
effectiveness of the U.S. armed forces would decline. If military effectiveness
declined as a result of foreign military decisions to lift gay bans, then that might
suggest that a similar result could ensue if U.S. law and policy shifted. If
military effectiveness either increased or remained the same after foreign
military forces decided to allow gays and lesbians to serve openly, that might

32. The discharge rates fluctuated considerably; in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they dipped
below 1,000 per year, but on average during the Cold War, the annual discharge rate was about
2,000. See DoD’s Policy on Homosexuality: Report to Congressional Requesters, 8 GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE (1992). See Rhonda L. Evans, U.S. Military Policies Concerning Homosexuals: Development,
Implementation, and Outcomes, 11 LAW AND SEXUALITY 113 (2002).
33. Id.
34. Donnelly, supra note 1.
35. Belkin, supra note 29.
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id.
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cast doubt on the plausibility of disastrous predictions about a policy change in
the U.S.
Numerous social scientific studies have found that despite occasional and
isolated problems of adjustment, foreign militaries that have lifted their gay
bans have not suffered any overall decrease in cohesion, readiness, morale, or
38
recruiting as a result of their policy transitions. Indeed, in the more than thirty
39
years since the Dutch military became the first to lift its gay ban, there has not
been a single study documenting any decline in cohesion, readiness, recruiting,
or morale as a result of a decision to lift a gay ban in any of the twenty-four
foreign forces which have done so since that time. Despite the complete absence
of studies to bolster their claims, Donnelly and other opponents of integration
have continued to assert and then repeat several distinct claims about foreign

38. See Aaron Belkin and Jason McNichol, Effects of the 1992 Lifting of Restrictions on Gay and
Lesbian Service in the Canadian Forces: Appraising the Evidence (The Center for the Study of Sexual
Minorities in the Military [CSSMM] 2000); see also Aaron Belkin & Melissa Levitt, The Effects of
Including Gay and Lesbian Soldiers in the Israeli Defense Forces: Appraising the Evidence (CSSMM 2000);
see also Aaron Belkin & Jason McNichol, The Effects of Including Gay and Lesbian Soldiers in the
Australian Defence Forces: Appraising the Evidence (CSSMM 2000); see also Aaron Belkin & R. L. Evans,
The Effects of Including Gay and Lesbian Soldiers in the British Armed Forces: Appraising the Evidence
(CSSMM 2000) (all of these studies are available at http://www.palmcenter.org/publications/dadt).
See also RAND’s National Defense Research Institute Report. RAND researchers conducted
interviews with Canadian military personnel several months after the removal of the ban on gay and
lesbian soldiers. They found no evidence that the policy change had had any appreciable effect on
any aspect of military life or performance. (RAND’s report was begun at the request of U.S.
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin sometime after January 29, 1993 and completed before July 19, 1993.);
see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILITARY: POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF
FOREIGN COUNTRIES (1993) [hereinafter GAO 1993] (A U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)
analysis of the first six months of Canada’s new policy also found no problems associated with the
change. In their interviews with members of Parliament, gay advocacy groups, a veterans’ umbrella
group, the Canadian Human Rights Commission, the Department of National Defence, and the
Department of Justice, the researchers could find no one who had received any reports of
resignations, lower recruitment, morale or cohesiveness problems, or gay-bashing incidents. In
addition, the GAO found no reports of open displays of homosexual behavior). In June 1993, seven
months after the Australian ban on homosexual service was lifted, the General Accounting Office of
the United States conducted interviews with ADF officials to document early outcomes associated
with the change (GAO 1993). The short overview of the policy change concludes with a summary
statement based on comments from an “Australian official,” who stated that: “Although it is too
early to assess the results of the revised policy, no reported changes have occurred in the number of
persons declaring his or her sexual preference or the number of recruits being inducted. Effects on
unit cohesiveness have not yet been fully determined. However, early indications are that the new
policy has had little or no adverse impact.” (GAO 1993 at 19); see also U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
RESEARCH REPORT AT THE REQUEST OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE U.S. ARMY. The U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences issued a report in January of 1994 authored
by an outside consultant evaluating early outcomes of the lifting of the ban in Canada. The report
surveyed all publicly available literature to describe the original impetus to lift the ban as well as the
consequences of the 1992 policy change on a broad array of performance outcomes in the Canadian
Forces. It its summary of findings, the report states: “The impact of the policy change has been
minimal. Negative consequences predicted in the areas of recruitment, employment, attrition,
retention, and cohesion and morale have not occurred in the 6-month period since revocation of the
exclusionary policy.” (Pinch 1994: vii-viii). See also F.C. Pinch, 1994. Perspectives on Organizational
Change in the Canadian Forces (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences,
1994).
39. GREGORY HEREK ET AL., OUT IN FORCE 114 (University of Chicago Press 1996).
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militaries, each of which are untrue or misleading. Here, we address each claim
in turn.
To begin, Donnelly posits that the studies that document the successful
experiences of foreign militaries that lifted their bans are based “on anecdotal
40
information and opinion, largely gathered from like-minded sources.” Her
evidence? She reprints several sections of a previously published critique of a
Palm Center study. The original study, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Is the Gay Ban Based
on Military Necessity? was published by PARAMETERS, the official journal of the
Army War College, and found that Britain, Canada, Israel, and Australia
41
successfully lifted their bans, with no detriment to military effectiveness. In a
subsequent 2004 issue, PARAMETERS published a critique of Belkin’s study, as
well as Belkin’s reply to that assessment. Here is the 2004 passage that Donnelly
re-prints:
Belkin’s article is entirely anecdotal. It is nothing more than selected quotes
from supposed experts who claim that homosexual integration has had no
impact on unit cohesion or military readiness. A quick review of the author’s
endnotes, cross-checked with an internet search, reveals the questionable
credentials and political leanings of most of these experts. At one point, Belkin
refers to a 1995 Canadian government report, which supposedly indicates that
lifting the ban on gays in the military had ‘no effect.’ However, his endnote
42
does not cite the report but a ‘personal communication with Karol Wenek.’

The passage which Donnelly found wanting in Belkin’s article read: “A 1995
internal report from the Canadian government on the lifting of the ban
concluded, ‘Despite all the anxiety that existed through the late 80s into the early
43
90s about the change in policy, here’s what the indicators show—no effect.’”
The supporting footnote cites the source of the quote: “Personal communication
with Karol Wenek, Directorate of Policy Analysis and Development, Canadian
44
Forces, 20 January, 2000.” As Belkin explained in his 2004 response, there was
a straightforward reason why he cited a personal communication with Wenek
rather than the document itself (titled “Briefing Note for Director of Public
Policy,” Ottawa, Canadian Forces, 25 August 1995): the quote was intended to
represent Wenek’s description of the report’s conclusion, and hence sufficed to
summarize its findings. The Palm Center posted the original report on its web
site four years ago, and it remains there to this day.
As Belkin also explained in his 2004 reply, his research is anything but
anecdotal. His published work on foreign militaries is based on reviews of
hundreds of printed sources including government documents. And as the
studies explain in detail, Belkin and his colleagues used standard social scientific
practices to ensure that their search for documents and experts was thorough.
Anyone interested in the source lists can consult the extensive reference sections

40.
41.

Donnelly, supra note 1, at 927.
Aaron Belkin, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Is the Gay Ban Based on Military Necessity?
PARAMETERS 111 (2003).
42. Donnelly, supra note 1.
43. Belkin, supra note 41, at 118.
44. Donnelly, supra note 1.
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of studies listed in endnote 6 of the Parameters article. The interview subjects
cited in the Parameters article included officers and enlisted personnel, ministry
representatives, academics, veterans, politicians, and nongovernmental
observers, including every identifiable expert in Israel, Canada, Britain, and
Australia on gays in the military. In other words, Belkin and his colleagues
interviewed the universe of experts, a standard far exceeding the acceptable
research practice of interviewing a representative sample of experts. They
included and interviewed every identifiable expert who had opposed allowing
gays to serve openly in these four militaries. One of Belkin’s interview subjects,
for example, was Professor Christopher Dandeker, former Chair of War Studies
at Kings College London and perhaps the most distinguished scholar of the
British military. In 1999, Dandeker wrote that if Britain lifted its ban, readiness
46
would deteriorate. After British policy changed, Dandeker concluded that his
47
prediction had been incorrect. When the totality of experts on a particular
military, including those who had predicted disaster, testifies that there is no
indication that lifting a ban undermined military effectiveness that does not
amount to anecdotal evidence.
In addition to claiming that studies which document foreign military
successes are based on anecdotes, Donnelly says that foreign militaries that have
lifted their bans have suffered as a result. “Contrary to the notion that all has
gone well,” she notes, “European newspapers have reported recruiting and
48
disciplinary problems in the British military.” She cites five newspaper and
49
radio stories to support her assertion. The question of consequence, however,
is not whether “all has gone well,” as scholars of gays and lesbians in foreign
militaries acknowledge quite candidly that isolated adjustment problems have
occurred in some units following the lifting of gay bans. Rather, the question is
whether overall military effectiveness has increased, decreased, or remained the
same as a result of the lifting of gay bans. Neither Donnelly nor anyone else has
presented a shred of evidence of an overall decline in any country that has lifted
its ban. Indeed, none of the five media stories that Donnelly cites shows or even
suggests that the lifting of a gay ban undermined the overall readiness of any
50
foreign military. One of those stories, for example, is headlined, War Blamed as
51
6,000 Quit Territorial Army. Is Donnelly insinuating that the lifting of the gay
ban is to blame? Can this be the best evidence to show that the lifting of the

45. The studies cited in endnote 6 of the original article, Belkin, supra note 41, at 118.
46. See Tarak Barkawi & Christopher Dandeker, Rights and Fights: Sexual Orientation and Military
Effectiveness, 24 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 186 (1999).
47. AARON BELKIN & GEOFFREY BATEMAN, DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL: DEBATING THE GAY BAN IN
THE MILITARY 132–34 (Lynne Rienner, 2003).
48. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 926.
49. Id. at n. 545.
50. Id. at n. 545.
51. Michael Smith, War Blamed as 6,000 Quit Territorial Army, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 30,
2005, at News 2. This article makes no mention of gay service. Only one of her five citations
mentions gay service, and that article refers to Navy efforts in the U.K. to recruit gay sailors,
Nicholas Hellen, Navy Signals for Help to Recruit Gay Sailors, TIMESONLINE (London), Feb. 20, 2005,
available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article516647.ece.
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British ban has undermined military effectiveness? The article itself makes no
reference to the lifting of the ban or to gays and lesbians in the military.
Meanwhile, the British Ministry of Defence itself has completed several indepth, service-wide assessments, which concluded that the decision to allow
gays and lesbians to serve openly did not have any overall negative effect on
cohesion, morale, readiness, or recruiting, despite a few isolated problems in
52
some units. Rather than citing five media articles, which report on unrelated
problems the British military was facing, we wonder why Donnelly and the
Center for Military Readiness do not conduct an actual study of the effects of
decisions to lift gay bans in foreign militaries. As noted before, it has been over
53
thirty years since the Dutch military became the first to lift its ban, yet in that
time not a single study has documented a decrease in military effectiveness that
resulted from the lifting of a ban. Another challenge not met by Donnelly is
identification of a single expert, anywhere in the world, who believes that any of
the 24 foreign militaries that have lifted their gay bans have suffered an overall
decrease in cohesion, readiness, morale, or recruiting as a result. In our studies,
we have identified over one hundred who believe the opposite to be the case.
By way of dismissing wholesale the value of comparative analysis,
Donnelly notes that perhaps these lessons from foreign militaries are of limited
value, as some of the countries that have lifted their bans “have cultures quite
54
different from the United States.” It is certainly the case—and it is regularly
acknowledged by supporters of eliminating “don’t ask, don’t tell”—that
important differences distinguish the U.S. military from other armed forces. But
we suggest that the relevant question is not whether differences exist, but
whether they render foreign military experiences irrelevant for determining
whether military effectiveness would decline if gays and lesbians were allowed
to serve openly in the U.S. Indeed, as the Palm Center has shown elsewhere,
cultural differences do not diminish the usefulness of examining the experience
55
of foreign militaries to draw lessons by analogy. In their 2001 study published
by the journal ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, Belkin and Levitt argue that
American public and military culture are more tolerant of homosexuality than
56
the cultures of foreign countries which have lifted their bans. Moreover, they
show that tolerant national climates are not necessary for maintaining cohesion,
readiness, morale, and performance after the integration of a minority group
into the military. Among the 24 nations that allow gays and lesbians to serve in
the military, many include powerful social and political groups that oppose gay
57
rights. Similarly, it would not be possible for the numerous U.S. police and fire
departments that allow gays and lesbians to serve openly to continue to function

52. E.g., Tri-Service Review of the Armed Forces Policy on Homosexuality and Code of Social Conduct
(2000); A Review of the Armed Forces Policy on Homosexuality (2000).
53. HEREK, supra note 39.
54. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 927.
55. See Aaron Belkin & Melissa Levitt, Homosexuality and the Israel Defense Forces; Did Lifting the
Gay Ban Undermine Military Performance? 27 ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY 1 (2001).
56. Id. at 20–21.
57. THE GLOBAL EMERGENCE OF GAY AND LESBIAN POLITICS; NATIONAL IMPRINTS OF A
WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT (Barry Adam, Jan Willem Duyvendak & André Krouwel, eds., Temple
University Press 1999).
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smoothly if a fully tolerant national climate were necessary for the maintenance
of organizational effectiveness. While cautioning against unilaterally equating
the experience of racial integration with the integration of openly gay people, it
is nonetheless noteworthy that the U.S. military was ordered to allow AfricanAmerican soldiers to serve on an equal basis at a time when 63 percent of the
58
American public opposed integration. The example of racial integration does
demonstrate that tolerant cultural and institutional climates are not necessary
for maintaining organizational effectiveness when minority groups are
integrated into the military. Twenty-four countries have successfully integrated
gays and lesbians into their military forces, and each of these nations has a
unique culture. Clearly, countries representing a broad spectrum of cultural
differences have successfully lifted their bans. And experience shows that
nations can apply, and have applied, the successes of one nation to the prospects
of another.
Opponents of gays in the military have not responded to this evidence that
successful integration is possible, even at a time or in a place where a fully
tolerant culture does not exist. Nor have they acknowledged that some of the
59
evidence for this point comes from the U.S. example. Rather, they simply and
systematically repeat the assertion that U.S. culture is different. Instead of
engaging with the scholarly arguments, which have been part of the landscape
of the gays-in-the-military debate for years, Donnelly simply iterates the point
that American culture is unique; and she presumes that this declaration of
uniqueness and exceptionalism in and of itself represents the obstruction to the
successful lifting of the ban, when data show that in fact it does not.
Finally, Donnelly states that according to an expert, “nations without
official restrictions on gays in the military are also very restrictive in actual
60
practice.” She then cites a 1993 newspaper article to support her contention
61
that in Israel, gay soldiers are barred from elite combat positions. This ignores
the Palm Center’s 2001 survey of 136 combat soldiers in the Israel Defense
Forces, 17 percent of whom said that they know a gay soldier in their unit. (23
62
percent said ‘maybe’ and 60 percent said ‘no.’) Donnelly is correct in noting
that the reality on the ground does not always line up with policy after a
country decides to lift its gay ban. Again, however, the significant question is
not whether policy and practice are consistent, but whether the decision to lift a
gay ban undermines military effectiveness. The evidence shows that it does not.

58. Barkawi & Dandeker, supra note 46, at 195.
59. See Evans, supra note 50.
60. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 927 (explaining that Prof. Charles Moskos asserts this point.).
61. Id. at n.548 (citing Tom Philpott, In Israel: The Hard Reality - Gays Are Allowed to Serve in the
Military but They Are Not Fully Accepted, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at 11); Tom Philpott, Gay Israelis
Avoid Ridicule, Get Ahead by Staying in Closet, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at 13; Charles Moskos,
Services Will Suffer If Used for Social Experiments, RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 1993, at F1.
62. Aaron Belkin and Melissa Levitt, Homosexuality and the Israel Defense Forces; Did Lifting the
Gay Ban Undermine Military Performance? 27 ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY 541 (2001), available at
http://afs.sagepub.com/content/vol27/issue4/
and
at
http://www.palmcenter.org/publications/dadt/homosexuality_and_the_israel_defense_forces.
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GAYS, LESBIANS, AND U.S. WARTIME SERVICE
The “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy is often defended with the claim that
heterosexuals cannot form bonds of trust with gays and lesbians, and that to
force gays and straights to serve together would thus erode the unit cohesion
that is essential to fighting effectiveness. In light of this claim, it is perhaps
ironic that, as scholars have noticed, the Pentagon fires fewer gays and lesbians
during wartime, when cohesion matters most. Scholars have suggested that if
gays and lesbians truly undermined cohesion, perhaps it would make more
sense to increase discharges during times of combat.
Donnelly disputes the data showing that fewer gays and lesbians are fired
during wartime, but her claims are without merit, as the evidence shows that the
military delays and neglects gay discharges during war. For example, the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) has acknowledged that suspected gays
and lesbians have been sent to war, noting that,
as a result of these policies and laws, the situation that arises during a time of
deployment place[s] homosexuals in a no-win situation. They are allowed or
ordered to serve at the risk of their own lives with the probability of forced
discharge when hostilities end if their sexuality becomes an issue. By deploying
suspected homosexuals with their units, the services bring into question their
own argument that the presence of homosexuals seriously impairs the
63
accomplishment of the military mission.

Oddly, Donnelly cites a later version of this very same CRS report to bolster her
argument, but this version edits out the admission that gays and lesbians are
sometimes knowingly “ordered to serve at the risk of their own lives with the
64
probability of forced discharge when hostilities end.”
Other data confirms CRS’s conclusion. The journalist Randy Shilts
interviewed scores of service members from the first Gulf War and documented
a pattern of retaining gays during war, and then discharging them once peace
65
returns. A number of press reports describe the practice of letting known gays
serve during wartime, including more than one article in THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL about troops who revealed their sexual orientation and were
66
knowingly sent to war. In 2006 and 2007, the Navy twice deployed a gay sailor

63. Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Services: Hearings Before the Senate Armed
Services Comm., 103d Cong. 17–18 (Mar. 29, 1993) (testimony of David F. Burrelli, Analyst in National
Defense, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress).
64. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 921, n.515.
65. The Shilts tapes are stored in the Randy Shilts Papers at the San Francisco Public Library.
For published articles, see Randy Shilts, Military May Defer Discharge of Gays, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 11,
1991; Randy Shilts, Army Discharges Lesbian Who Challenged Ban, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 1991; Randy
Shilts, Gay Troops in the Gulf War Can’t Come Out, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 18, 1991; Randy Shilts, In Wake of
War, Military Again Targets Gays, S.F. CHRON., Aug 5, 1991; also see RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT
UNBECOMING: GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE U.S. MILITARY (Columbine-Fawcett 1993).
66. See Wade Lambert, Gay GI’s Told, Serve Now, Face Discharge Later WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1991, at
B1; Wade Lambert & Stephanie Simon, U.S. Military Moves to Discharge Some Gay Veterans of Gulf
War, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1991, at B6; Doug Grow, Captain Did her Duty, Despite Military’s Mixed
Messages, MINN. STAR TRIB., March 16, 1993, at 3B; David Kirby, Think Before You Tell, THE
ADVOCATE, Dec. 4, 2001.
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His dismissal
to duty despite his public acknowledgement that he was gay.
form was marked “completion of service” rather than homosexual conduct, thus
68
allowing the Navy to re-deploy him in the future. Only after the sailor became
the subject of an article in STARS AND STRIPES, a military newspaper, did the
69
Navy finally and swiftly discharge him for homosexual conduct.
In 2005, the Palm Center publicized additional data showing this same
pattern of retaining known gay and lesbian troops during the recent wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, notwithstanding the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. The
evidence the Palm Center supplied began with an Army Commander’s
Handbook obtained in 2005 entitled, “Regulation 500-3-3 Volume III, Reserve
Component Unit Commanders Handbook.” In Table 2.1 on “Personnel Actions
during the Mobilization Process,” it says under the criterion of “homosexuality”:
“if discharge is not requested prior to the unit’s receipt of alert notification,
70
discharge isn’t authorized. Member will enter AD [active duty] with the unit.”
As we reported, the intent of this document—to reduce the loss of personnel
during mobilization—was corroborated by Kim Waldron, spokesperson at the
U.S. Army Forces Command at Fort McPherson, who acknowledged publicly
that the Pentagon was sending openly gay service members into combat in Iraq:
“The bottom line is some people are using sexual orientation to avoid
deployment,” she said. “So in this case, with the Reserve and Guard forces, if a
soldier ‘tells,’ they still have to go to war and the homosexual issue is postponed
71
until they return to the U.S. and the unit is demobilized.”
Donnelly disputes our interpretation of the regulation, but her sole
evidence for doing so is a personal email she received from a military
spokesperson, which Donnelly declares “countered that argument with a
72
clarification.” The email itself, however, offers no evidence or explanation for
why the earlier official Pentagon statement given might be wrong, but is simply
a re-statement of policy, saying that if a soldier declares himself or herself to be
gay or lesbian, “the review process continues while the unit is deployed and
there is no delay in resolving the matter or discharging the Soldier if that is the
73
resolution.” The email is non-responsive to the question of whether gays are,
in fact, discharged when they make statements, since it effectively cancels itself
out by ending with the phrase “if that is the resolution.”
67. See Joseph Giordono, Discharged Gay Sailor is Called Back to Active Duty, STARS AND STRIPES,
May 6, 2007, available at http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&articles=54151&article
=true; Joseph Giordono. Discharge Papers ‘Don’t Tell’ Sailor is Gay, STARS AND STRIPES, May 7, 2007,
available at http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=54054&archive=true; Joseph
Giordono, Navy Bars Outed Gay Sailor From Return to Service, STARS AND STRIPES, June 10, 2007,
available
at
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=54151&archive=true
[hereinafter Giordono, Navy Bars].
68. Giorono, Navy Bars, supra note 57.
69. Id.
70. FORSCOM REGULATION 500-3-3 VOLUME III, RESERVE COMPONENT UNIT COMMANDERS
HANDBOOK (1990) since updated.
71. Waldron’s statements were reported in the WASHINGTON BLADE: Lou Chibbaro Jr., Out Gay
Soldiers Sent to Iraq, Regulation Keeps Straights from “Playing Gay” to Avoid War, WASHINGTON BLADE,
Sept. 23, 2005, available at http://www.washblade.com/2005/9-23/news/national/outiraq.cfm.
72. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 921.
73. Id. at 921, n.517.
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The Palm Center received a nearly identical “personal” email from the
Pentagon seeking to reverse Waldron’s statement, in response to our own effort
74
to corroborate the Pentagon practice of retaining known gays.
The only
difference is that the email to Donnelly references the Pentagon’s earlier
statement as coming from a “spokesman” while the email to us uses the word,
“spokesperson” since it is in response to the statement of a woman, Kim
75
Waldron. This means that, apparently, Waldron was not the only person to
have acknowledged, in an official capacity, that during mobilization,
homosexual discharge proceedings are postponed until the service member
returns home.
Donnelly posits that it is a “contradictory claim” to argue both that the
military is losing too many gay and lesbian troops and also that discharge
76
figures have declined since the United States went to war. There is, of course,
no contradiction: one can simultaneously point to how any gay discharge
undermines military readiness, while noting a downturn in discharge figures.
And the discharge downturns since the U.S. mobilized for war in 2001 are
undisputed: those figures declined every year but one since 2002, echoing a clear
historical pattern in which gay and lesbian discharges decrease in all wars and
77
military conflicts. The reader can weigh the evidence against the veracity of
the claims made by Donnelly and decide which is more persuasive. The
Congressional Research Service, the Palm Center, and the other sources noted
above have made the evidence available to the public.
A SEA CHANGE IN MILITARY OPINION
“Don’t ask, don’t tell” is designed to address heterosexual discomfort with
serving alongside known gays and lesbians, and it is certainly the case that
prejudice, intolerance, and discomfort remain a part of the American cultural
landscape. While it is true that many different kinds of Americans work
together, play together, and live together, it is no doubt also the case that racism,
sexism, and religious intolerance exist. In none of these cases, however, does the
government take polls of service members in order to formulate military
personnel policy that caters to whether one group likes or dislikes another
group. In the case of “don’t ask, don’t tell,” however, Donnelly believes that
unless and until heterosexual service members say that gays and lesbians should
be allowed to serve openly, then law, regulation, and policy should continue to
78
discriminate. And she selectively cites from unreliable polls to support her
79
claim that integration would fail.
While service members’ attitudes about
serving alongside gays and lesbians cannot be assessed with 100 percent
accuracy, some compelling data are nonetheless available, and those data
suggest that significant shifts have taken place.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Chibbaro, supra note 71.
Id.
Donnelly, supra note 1, at 920.
See Evans, supra note 32.
Donnelly, supra note 1.
Id. at 917–19.
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Before documenting those shifts, however, it is important to explain why
the polling results must be interpreted with caution, and why the polls that
Donnelly cites are among the least reliable. The Pentagon has, for years, rejected
repeated requests to study “don’t ask, don’t tell” and this has posed a serious
obstacle to those who want to understand attitudes of active duty service
members. Without the Pentagon’s cooperation, it is impossible to obtain a truly
random sample of military personnel. And random sampling is the gold
standard of surveying techniques. When a scholar wants to know about the
attitudes of a population of people, usually it is necessary to take a poll of one
sample of respondents drawn from the overall population in which the scholar
is interested. For example, to determine whether Americans believe that the
President is doing a good job, it is too expensive to survey every single U.S.
citizen, and it is not possible to force universal participation. So, pollsters isolate
a sample, usually about 1,000 people, and then report the attitudes of people in
that sample as if they represented the same attitudes as the entire American
public. They use statistical techniques to create a model sample that best reflects
the whole.
80
Donnelly calls for “an objective poll of identified military personnel” and
81
complains that available polling data are not based on random sampling. But
without the Pentagon’s cooperation, no scholar can draw a random sample of
military personnel. Hence, scholars must develop techniques and sampling
strategies to assemble respondents who will answer their surveys and will best
reflect the population they wish to study. Such statistical data are universally
considered a valid method of data collection and widely used. In fact, virtually
no polling is done using truly random sampling techniques. Almost all survey
results including publicly released U.S. Census data and virtually every data
product produced by the U.S. government uses statistical weighting. Indeed, it
should be noted that polls that Donnelly and her allies have cited over the past
14 years to show that the troops dislike gays use just such approaches rather
than random sampling, yet Donnelly never objects to the validity of polls that
ostensibly support her case. In fact, Donnelly cites selectively from polls based
on the least reliable methodologies.
One poll which Donnelly cites, for example, is administered to Military
82
Times readers every year. The December 2003 Military Times poll of 933 active
duty subscribers found that only 24.6 percent of respondents believe that gays
and lesbians should be allowed to serve openly, with 63.2 percent opposing and
83
12.2 percent expressing no opinion. While it is interesting and instructive to
survey MILITARY TIMES readers, this group does not represent overall military
opinion because it is not truly representative of the full military population.
Unlike the overall military, the pool of MILITARY TIMES survey respondents was
split about evenly in composition between officers and enlisted personnel, and
included only nine individuals ranked E-3 or below, and only 41 individuals

80. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 918 n.502.
81. Id.
82. See the MILITARY TIMES Poll 200, http://www.militarycity.com/polls/2003_chart2.php#2
(raw data from the Military Times on file with author).
83. Id.
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aged 24 or below. As both the Annenberg poll (discussed below) and MILITARY
TIMES data show, support for allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly
decreases as rank increases, and both the MILITARY TIMES and Gallup data show
that support decreases as age rises. Hence, the Military Times results probably
under-estimated overall military support for integration.
By contrast, Donnelly complains about a 2006 poll designed by Dr. Laura
Miller, a military expert, along with scholars at the Palm Center, and
84
adminstered by Zogby to 545 troops who served in Afghanistan or Iraq.
Donnelly says that the “absence of random access undermines the credibility of
the poll,” but fails to acknowledge that statistical weights were used to
approximate a representative sample of military respondents; in other words,
mostly male, mostly conservative, and mostly enlisted. Using statistical weights
to approximate a randomly drawn sample is less compelling than random
sampling itself, but it is, again, a commonly-used technique when random
access is not available. Statistical weighting is a much more scientific approach
than that used by the Military Times poll which Donnelly praises; yet Donnelly
makes no mention of this fact. Donnelly complains that the poll was
administered to a sample drawn “from a purchased list of U.S. Military
Personnel” and wrongly assumes this cannot be true because “the U.S. military
85
does not sell or provide access to personnel lists.” The list, however, was not
purchased or obtained from the military (nor did we ever make such a claim),
but was obtained from vendors who compile such lists. Again, this approach is
not as solid as random sampling, but in the absence of Pentagon cooperation,
there can be no random sampling. Rather than bemoaning the lack of random
sampling by researchers, Donnelly should call on the Pentagon to cooperate
with researchers to obtain the needed data, or offer a better scientific approach
than the methods outlined here for tapping into military opinion.
What do the most well-designed polls say about military opinion? In 1993,
two different surveys found that only 16 percent of male service members
86
believed that gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve. Since that time,
however, shifts have occurred in two distinct areas: whether service members
are personally comfortable around gays and lesbians, and whether they believe
that gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve openly. On both counts,
military opinion has shifted dramatically and there are a number of ways that
87
this has been documented.
First consider the question of personal comfort. The 2006 Zogby poll of 545
troops who had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan found that 72 percent are
personally comfortable interacting with gays, and that of the 20 percent who are
uncomfortable, 15 percent are “somewhat” uncomfortable and only five percent
84. Opinions of Military Personnel on Sexual Minorities in the Military, Zogby International, Dec.
2006.
85. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 918.
86. Melissa Healy, The Times Poll: 74% of Military Enlistees Oppose Lifting Gay Ban, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1993, at A1 [hereinafter Healy]; Laura L. Miller, Fighting for a Just Cause: Soldiers’
Views on Gays in the Military, in GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE MILITARY: ISSUES, CONCERNS AND
CONTRASTS 70 (Wilbur J. Scott & Sandra Carson Stanley, eds., Aldine de Bruyter 1994) [hereinafter
Miller].
87. Belkin, Don’t Ask, supra note 8.
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are “very” uncomfortable. A March 2000 study by Major John W. Bicknell of
the Naval Postgraduate School found that between 1994 and 1999, the
percentage of U.S. Navy officers who “feel uncomfortable in the presence of
89
homosexuals” decreased from 57.8 percent to 36.4 percent. General Wesley
Clark confirmed in 2003 that the “temperature of the issue has changed over the
decade. People were much more irate about this issue in the early ‘90s than I
found in the late ‘90s, for whatever reason, younger people coming in [to the
military]. It just didn’t seem to be the same emotional hot button issue by ‘98,
90
‘99, that it had been in ‘92, ‘93.” The data suggest that the majority of service
members feel comfortable around gays and lesbians, and that for most of those
who do not feel comfortable, the issue has become less emotionally intense in
recent years.
What about service members’ policy preferences? We noted above that in
the early 1990s, only a small minority of male service members favored allowing
91
gays to serve openly.
An October 2004 poll by the Annenberg National
92
Election Survey provides one window into service members’ current thinking.
According to Annenberg, 42 percent of service members believe that gays and
lesbians should be allowed to serve openly. Somewhat surprising is that a slim
majority of 50 percent of junior enlisted service members (versus 43 percent
93
opposed) believes that gays and lesbians should serve openly. (Officers and
94
NCOs, by contrast, remain opposed.) This finding is potentially significant not
only because it represents a shift from the 1993 polls, but because junior enlisted
service members are those individuals whose supposed inability to develop
bonds of trust with openly gay peers is the stated rationale for “don’t ask, don’t
tell.”
Unlike many other polls of military attitudes, Annenberg obtained a
sample that was roughly representative of the entire military by using a
scientific procedure in which phone numbers were “randomly selected by a
computer from a complete list of thousands of active residential exchanges
95
across the country.” Of the many thousands of individuals contacted by
Annenberg, 655 respondents indicated that they or a household member had
96
served in the military between February and October 2004. The responses from
those military households were isolated from civilian households and analyzed
97
separately to generate the findings of the poll. For those service members
deployed abroad or unavailable to complete the survey, a household family

88. Zogby, supra note 7.
89. John W. Bicknell, Jr., Study of Naval Officers’ Attitudes Toward Homosexuals in the Military
(submitted for the degree of Master of Science in Management, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, Mar. 2000).
90. Meet the Press transcript (NBC television broadcast June 15, 2003).
91. Healy, supra note 84; Miller, supra note 86.
92. See NAES 04, National Annenberg Election Survey, available at http://www.annenbergpublic
policycenter.org/naes/2004_03_2military-data_10-16_pr.pdf [hereinafter NAES 04].
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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98

member was queried as a proxy. One potential bias of this methodology is that
if a family member holds views that are inconsistent with those of the service
member, the polling results may not reflect the same findings of a purely
random approach. That said, some research demonstrates a degree of political
99
similarity among husbands and wives. In addition, considering that service
members are deployed throughout the world in so many different locales,
Annenberg’s methodology appears to come much closer to approximating a
representative, randomly drawn sample than other non-random methods for
surveying military opinion.
Finally, Donnelly says of the Zogby poll that “the twenty-six percent of
respondents who wanted the law repealed could not compete with the
combined sixty-nine percent of people who were opposed to or neutral on
100
repeal.” Given that 32 percent of respondents were neutral, however, another
way of reporting the data is that the 37 percent who disagree with allowing gays
and lesbians to serve openly could not compete with the 58 percent who favor
repeal or who are neutral. Perhaps this is the point at which to remember that
the rationale that Congress articulated for firing gays and lesbians is that
heterosexuals could not work with gays and lesbians and develop bonds of trust
with them, and that unit cohesion would therefore deteriorate following the
lifting of the ban. The question, in other words, is not whether the troops want
the ban to be lifted, but whether they can work with gays and lesbians. And on
this point, as described above, the data are, in fact, decisive: a continuously
shrinking minority of service members expresses adamant opposition to
working with gays and lesbians.
To return to a question raised at the beginning of this section, how relevant
are the troops’ attitudes, especially when it comes to whether or not they say
they can work with gays and lesbians? In both Britain and Canada, prior to the
lifting of gay bans, about two-thirds of troops said that they could not work with
gays and lesbians. But when policies changed in both countries, there were but
a handful of resignations, and no overall decrease in cohesion. If the Pentagon is
ordered to allow gays and lesbians to serve openly, military leaders will find
ways to ensure that the policy transition is a non-event, as it was in every other
country that lifted its ban. That is what matters.
LOSS OF CRITICAL SPECIALISTS, INCLUDING ARABIC LINGUISTS
In November 2002, the Palm Center’s Dr. Nathaniel Frank reported in the
101
NEW REPUBLIC that the military had fired seven Arabic linguists for being gay.
The news made international headlines and struck a chord among the public at
large. Prior reports had indicated that intercepted intelligence cables warning of
th
the attacks of September 11 had never been translated due to the government’s
shortage of Arabic linguists, and the public was surprised that translators were
98. Id.
99. M. Kent Jennings and Laura Stoker, Political Similarity and Influence Among Husbands and
Wives (Institute of Governmental Studies, Working Paper 2001–14, 2001).
100. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 917.
101. Nathaniel Frank, Perverse: The Gay Ban vs. the War on Terrorism, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 18,
2002).
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being purged under the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. Since the story first broke
more than five years ago, additional evidence has come to light. In 2005, for
example, the Government Accountability Office reported that the military had
fired 322 linguists with skills in important foreign languages during the first
decade of “don’t ask, don’t tell,” and in 2007, the Associated Press reported that
the military had fired a total of 58 Arabic linguists for being gay during the first
102
fourteen years of the policy.
The Palm Center was responsible for bringing
some of these data to the public’s attention, and Donnelly writes that there are
103
“several disparities” in the linguist data reported by Palm researchers.
Donnelly tries to cast doubt over the data by suggesting that because some
of the linguists who were discharged had not completed advanced training, they
cannot reasonably be called “linguists,” and she minimizes the significance of
another report of fired linguists by saying their “type and level of proficiency. . .
104
varied considerably.” In yet another instance, Donnelly suggests that the Palm
Center (formerly named the CSSMM) published a misleading report about
linguists who were fired for being gay. Here is what she says:
In July 1994 [sic], the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military
(CSSMM) claimed the military was discharging valuable personnel in important
military specialties. These included, for example,”49 nuclear, biological, and
chemical warfare specialists; 212 medical-care workers; 90 nuclear power
engineers; 52 missile guidance and control operators; 10 rocket, missile and
other artillery specialists; 340 infantrymen; 88 linguists; and 163 lawenforcement specialists.”. . .As for the eighty-eight discharged linguists, the list
of “Primary DoD Occupation Code” titles includes, at number 241, “Language
interrogation,” an occupation from which a total of fifteen persons were
separated due to homosexuality. But that is seventy-three persons short of the
number of discharged “linguists” cited. How to account for the discrepancy? A
Duty Base Facility Identifier Table, also provided by the DMDC, indicates that a
total of seventy-three persons were separated from the Presidio of Monterey,
where the Defense Language Institute is located. It is not clear how the CSSMM
came up with the claim that “eighty-eight linguists” were discharged due to the
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. Fifteen plus seventy-three, coincidentally,
105
equals eighty-eight.

If the reader of Donnelly’s accusation came away with the false impression
that the Palm Center had tried to “pull a fast one,” we would not be surprised.
What does surprise us, however, is that Donnelly ignores the qualifications that
the Palm Center published when it first released the original data. In the same
press release that Donnelly cites above, and in which we reported the discharge
of linguists, we noted that “with regard to foreign language specialists, the
military discharged 73 service members from the Presidio of Monterey, home of
the Defense Language Institute (DLI), and 15 specialists in language

102. See GAO, Defense Force Management, DOD’s Policy on Homosexuality, Report to
Congressional Requesters, GAO/NSIAD-92-98, June, 1992, Ex.PX-5. Lolita C. Baldor, Military
discharges gay Arabic linguists: congress members seek hearing, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 23, 2007.
103. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 922.
104. Id. at 923.
105. Id. at 922–23.
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interrogation, for an apparent total of 88 linguists between 1998-2003.” Further,
we stated that we proactively sought further data to confirm these figures,
noting that “the CSSMM has submitted a second FOIA request to determine the
specific language expertise of the discharged linguists, and to determine
107
whether all of those discharged from the DLI were linguists.”
We carefully
qualified our interpretation, in other words, and we published all original data
on our web site for readers to verify our claims. And when we obtained the
results of our second data request, we published those data on our web site as
well. Our conclusions remained the same. The Pentagon has released data
about discharged linguists in fits and starts, and often in confusing formats. The
Palm Center has published all the original data that we have obtained so that
readers can form their own conclusions.
THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR: NAME-CALLING THAT PASSES FOR
SCHOLARLY ANALYSIS
What to do when all the evidence stacks up against the position you favor?
In 2005, a cadet at West Point named Alexander Raggio wrote a senior thesis
entitled “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Be: A Philosophical Analysis of the Gay
Ban in the U.S. Military,” in which he argued that the ban should be scrapped
108
because it is inconsistent with military values.
West Point’s English
Department then honored Raggio with the Brigadier General Carroll E. Adams
Award for best thesis, an award that is presented each May to the West Point
Cadet who writes the best thesis in Art, Philosophy, or Literature. The study
also earned special recognition from the Vice Dean for education. Elaine
Donnelly’s Center for Military Readiness, in turn, nominated West Point for its
so-called “Patsy Award” for having given the Brigadier General Carroll E.
109
Adams Award to Raggio. The name of the award is based on the following
sham definition of a “patsy,” which, according to Donnelly, is engraved on the
award plaque: “An Official Whom Feminists Have Used to Impose Their
110
Policies on the Men and Women of the Military.”
The award appears
designed to scold officials for what Donnelly refers to elsewhere as “fem fear,”
which she defines as “an emotion that grips the hearts of men who are terrified

106. Palm Center Press Release, Mission-Critical Specialists Discharged For Homosexuality: New Data
Reveal Extensive Talent Loss Under ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.’ June 21, 2004, available at
http://www.palmcenter.org/press/dadt/releases/mission_critical_specialists_discharged_for_ho
mosexuality_new_data_reveal_extensive_talent_loss_under_dont_a (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. Lt. Alexander H. Raggio, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Be: A Philosophical Analysis of the
Gay Ban in the U.S. Military,” Senior Thesis, United States Military Academy at West Point, Apr. 29,
2005.
109. See CMR Announces Inaugural ‘Patsy’ Award, (Oct. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.cmrlink.org/PeopleintheNews.asp?docID=280 [hereinafter CMR].
110. See CMR, supra note 109. According to the Oxford English Dictionary the definition of
“patsy” is “a person who is ridiculed, deceived, blamed, or victimized,” 2 THE NEW SHORTER
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2125 (Clarendon Press, 1993). On the etymology of the term as racist
slang and “an example of racial cliché, in this case Irish Stupidity,” see Louis Phillips, On the Origin of
Patsy 65 AMERICAN SPEECH 193 (1990).
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that feminists—including women on the Armed Services Committees—might
111
get angry at them.”
Donnelly argues that “Raggio had every right to express his opinions, but
the paper was thinly sourced and did not even cite or accurately describe the
112
text of the 1993 law.” As to the veracity and substance of Donnelly’s critique
of Raggio’s work: Raggio offers twelve footnotes to support approximately
eighteen pages of text, but Donnelly offers no evidence about the relevant
standard, in other words the average or expected number of citations in a West
Point undergraduate thesis. As to his reading of the law, Donnelly offers no
elaboration as to why she thinks it is incorrect, and no analysis of Raggio’s
central argument. If Donnelly wants to engage in a serious discussion about the
quality of Raggio’s work, then she is of course welcome to do so. While we are
always glad to engage in an honest conversation about the quality of research
related to gays and lesbians in the military, we are concerned when participants
in the debate resort to name-calling in lieu of scholarly analysis.
SHOOTING THE MESSENGER
113

Donnelly refers repeatedly to the Palm Center as an activist group. In an
online article describing the awarding of CMR’s inaugural “Patsy Award,” the
Palm Center (formerly the CSSMM, but wrongly identified by Donnelly as
Berkeley-based), is accused of misrepresenting our research and mission. The
web site states: “The Berkley-based [sic] CSSMM presents itself as an objective
source, but it is actually an activist group that relentlessly pushes for
homosexuals in the military,” and continues by claiming that “The CSSMM has
offered honoraria to individuals who write papers or schedule college campus
events promoting that cause, and routinely releases contrived ‘studies,’ based on
114
faux data, to promote their doctrinaire agenda.” She writes,
The only thing that has changed since 1993 is an illusion of momentum for
repeal of the law created by a skilled and persistent public relations campaign
that began in 2003, the tenth anniversary of passage of the law. . . . The public
relations campaign has been advanced most often by periodic releases of
various ‘studies,’ reports, or polls produced, sponsored, or influenced by the
University of California, Berkeley-based [sic] Center for the Study of Sexual
Minorities in the Military (CSSMM), now called the Michael D. Palmer [sic]
Center, and like-minded groups. A closer look at materials produced by the
activist groups usually reveals questionable methodology and unsupported
115
conclusions.

The CMR web site states that the Palm Center is “an activist group that has
promoted homosexuals in the military for years—usually by releasing or

111. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 940.
112. Id. at 916.
113. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 918.
114. See CMR, supra note 109.
115. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 915−16.
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promoting various faux ‘studies’ that cannot withstand close scrutiny.”
Donnelly again refers to the Palm Center as “activist” in a reprint of a
WASHINGTON TIMES piece from March 18, 2007: “In December 2006, for example,
Zogby International released a poll that was commissioned by the Center for the
Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, a gay activist group now called the
117
Michael D. Palm Center.”
Her strategy echoes other critiques of the Palm Center’s research. For
example, and as previously mentioned, in 2004, PARAMETERS, the official journal
of the U.S. Army War College, published a critique of the Center’s integrity by
118
Major Joseph A. Craft of the U.S. Marines. Craft characterized the Palm Center
as “a homosexual activist group spreading pure propaganda poorly disguised
119
as legitimate research.”
He added that the Center is “engaged in an intense
information campaign to market, normalize, and legitimize the homosexual
120
political agenda.” These repeated characterizations and labeling of the Palm
Center’s work as “activist” are designed to negate its scholarly status by
implying to readers that the work of the Palm Center is biased, that its studies
are matters of foregone conclusion, and that its mission is influenced by a
political agenda to the point of lacking any objectivity or integrity.
The Palm Center is not an activist organization. Unlike activist groups, the
Palm Center publishes all data it finds, whether or not those data support one
particular policy or another. Indeed, Donnelly’s DUKE article includes evidence
that we published in the Zogby poll, evidence which she believes bolsters her
case. Even Charles Moskos, the principal architect of the “don’t ask, don’t tell”
policy, said that the Palm Center’s scholarship is “reflective of integrity and
honesty” and that he found the Palm Center’s reporting of facts regardless of
121
whether they support integration to be “remarkable and rare.”
As Belkin explained in his original reply to Maj. Craft, the Palm Center’s
research conclusions follow from the data, not from personal beliefs: “While my
passion for research derives in part from a desire to hold experts who fail to tell
the truth accountable,” Belkin wrote, “my research conclusions follow from
evidence, not from personal beliefs. If Craft or others can identify foreign
militaries whose effectiveness deteriorated or whose health care systems were
overwhelmed as a result of eliminating a ban, I will modify my views

116. Zogby Poll Spins Push for Gays in the Military, CENTER FOR MILITARY READINESS, Feb. 28, 2007,
http://www.cmrlink.org/HMilitary.asp?docID=287.
117. Elaine Donnelly, General Pace and the PC Police, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2007, available at
http://www.cmrlink.org/HMilitary.asp?docID=289.
118. Maj. Joseph A. Craft, Legitimate Debate, or Gay Propaganda? 34 PARAMETERS 132 (2004),
available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04summer/contents.htm [hereinafter
Craft].
119. Id.
120. Id. at 133.
121. Email from Charles Moskos to Aaron Belkin (Feb. 13, 2004 and Mar. 22, 2004) (on file with
author). Also cited in Craft, supra note 118.
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accordingly. (My institute will entertain fellowship applications for this
122
research, as always, in good faith.)” That offer, of course, still stands.
Perhaps most importantly, there is nothing radical and very little that is
unique in the Palm Center’s research. Many other scholars who are not
affiliated with the Palm Center, including military scholars as well as scholars
affiliated with the military and military organizations, have reached the same
conclusion that some of the Palm Center’s studies reach: allowing gays and
123
lesbians to serve openly would not harm the armed forces. Experts agree that
a growing body of evidence demonstrates that there is no negative impact on
military effectiveness when gays and lesbians serve openly. This is not to say
that there are no unanswered questions or a clear path to policy change, but the
basic facts remain: public and military opinions have changed since 1993, and
the evidence has amassed from both U.S. and foreign militaries that firing
people who say that they are gay is not necessary for the preservation of
military readiness. Donnelly is free, of course, to continue to pass judgment on
the Palm Center’s integrity. But even if the Palm Center’s research magically
disappeared, the remaining majority of scholarly evidence would still show that
integration would not harm the military. For those who wish to argue that
integration would harm the military, the empirical evidence so far simply is not
there.
A FINAL RED HERRING
Donnelly argues that the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy is a misnomer
because, contrary to what was widely reported in the press, Congress overrode
Clinton’s effort to liberalize the policy and simply codified the ban that was
previously in place. “Congress rejected President Clinton’s ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell’ proposal with overwhelming, veto-proof bipartisan majorities,” she
124
writes. “Instead, Congress passed a law that continued the pre-Clinton (1981)
125
policy of excluding homosexuals from the military.”
Donnelly repeats this
claim in several different ways, saying that “there is no way that bipartisan,
veto-proof majorities would have passed a law making it ‘easier’ for
126
homosexuals to serve.”
She claims that Congress adopted “unambiguous
127
statements” banning homosexuals from military service, but that the Clinton
128
administration “disregard[ed] the legal mandate” of the statute and that to

122. Aaron Belkin, Legitimate Debate, or Gay Propaganda? The Author Replies, 34.2 PARAMETERS: US
ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY 137 (2004), available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/
Parameters/04summer/contents.htm.
123. See National Defense Research Institute, Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Policy: Options and
Assessment (RAND 1993); Sarbin et al., Nonconforming Sexual Orientations and Military Suitability
(Defense Personnel Security Research and Education Center, PERS-TR-89-002), in GAYS IN UNIFORM:
THE PENTAGON SECRET REPORTS (Kate Dyer, ed., Alyson Publications 1988); Elizabeth Kier, Rights
and Fights: Sexual Orientation and Military Effectiveness, 24 INT’L SECURITY 196 (1999).
124. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 905.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 905–06.
127. Id. at 906.
128. Id. at 907.
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describe the policy as “don’t ask, don’t tell” “effectively slanders the statute.”
The only concession made by Congress to the spirit of the Clinton proposal, she
writes, “was ommision [sic] of ‘the question’ about homosexuality” at accession.
She claims, however, that “Congress nevertheless authorized restoration of
routine inquiries about homosexuality by a future Secretary of Defense” if
130
deemed necessary.
Donnelly is wrong on two counts. First, she misreads the law. The section
of 10 U.S.C § 654 that addresses the matter of asking recruits if they are gay or
lesbian does not have the force of law, but is contained in a “Sense of Congress”
which is non-binding and which does not “authorize” anything at all, but
merely states that “it is the sense of Congress that. . . the suspension of
questioning concerning homosexuality” that was begun under Clinton’s interim
131
policy in January 1993 should continue. Likewise, the section suggesting that
a Defense Secretary “may reinstate that questioning” is also only a “Sense of
Congress,” and is hence non-binding. Thus the law neither bans nor authorizes
asking, but remains silent on the point, leading to Donnelly’s second
fundamental mistake: there is no basis from which to conclude that the policy is
“inconsistent with the law,” since the policy does nothing that is forbidden by
the law, and there is nothing it fails to do that is mandated by the law. It is
equally unfounded to claim that Congress never would have passed a law
making it easier for gays and lesbians to serve, notwithstanding the
“restoration” clause suggested in the “Sense of Congress.” After all, Congress
would not have suggested continuing the suspension of asking about
132
homosexuality if a majority of its members wished otherwise. And so, in the
absence of any statutory requirement to ask recruits if they are gay or lesbian,
the Pentagon—quite legally—issued regulations that forbid the military from
forcing service members to reveal their sexual orientation: “Commanders or
appointed inquiry officials shall not ask, and members shall not be required to
133
reveal, whether a member is a heterosexual, a homosexual, or a bisexual.”
Donnelly’s objective is to cast the military policy as one that, by law, deems
homosexuals “ineligible” to serve in uniform, and she even takes the liberty of
134
re-naming the statute the “Military Personnel Eligibility Act.”
Having
(incorrectly) deemed the policy one of “ineligibility,” she then launches a
consequently misguided attack on several developments relating to the rules
governing homosexuality in the military. Upset that gays and lesbians are
entering the military at all, she blames the Pentagon for failing “to comply with
the legal requirement that entering service members should be informed of the

129. Elaine Donnelly, Constructing the Co-Ed Military, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 815, 912
(2007).
130. Id. at 907.
131. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993).
132. Case in point, Duncan Hunter proposed an Amendment to revert back to asking people if
they are homosexual before accession (H.AMDT.317), which failed 144-291. See Martin Kasindorf,
Gay Rights Lose in Military Bill, NEWSDAY, Sept. 29 1993.
133. Enlisted Administrative Separations, Department of Defense Directive Number 1332.14, and
Enclosures 1–4 (Dec. 21, 1993), incorporating changes from Mar. 4, 1994, certified current as of Nov.
21, 2003 [hereinafter Directive 1332.14].
134. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 913, 915.
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law, 10 U.S.C. § 654, which excludes homosexuals from the military.” If they
were told they were ineligible, she reasons, they would not enter in the first
place, and waste taxpayer money when they are discharged. She then
challenges the validity of polling data showing growing acceptance of gay
service, based on the principle that respondents are more likely to support
existing policy than to challenge it. “Incorrect assertions that ‘homosexuals can
serve in the military provided that they do not say that they are gay’ are
probably skewing polls of civilians,” she concludes, “who mistakenly believe
136
that homosexuals are already eligible to serve.” The Pentagon policy, in her
137
view, “misinforms potential recruits about the conditions of eligibility.” As we
have argued throughout this paper, her critiques are based on flawed logic and
empirical distortions. Yet another, independent reason why her critiques fall
away is the mistaken foundation on which many of her arguments rely—her
assertion that the Pentagon policy is an incorrect and unlawful implementation
of the statute.
We would like to be clear: the fact that service members who refrain from
homosexual conduct and conceal their homosexual identity remain technically
eligible for service does not mean that the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy
successfully distinguishes between conduct and status—punishing the former
while protecting the latter. This is because the policy defines “conduct” to
include statements of status, and defines “statement” to include any action or
138
inaction that fails to conceal one’s status from commanders.
Thus we agree
with Donnelly that the policy has the effect of banning homosexuals from
military service whenever they are unsuccessful at concealing who they are, but
not that the policy makes homosexuals, per se, “ineligible.” While the Pentagon
has spent fifteen years failing to enforce the law properly, it is not the case that
its original 1994 implementing regulations were “inconsistent with the law.”
Indeed, the entire question of compliance and whether or not the law is
consistent with the policy serves as a diversion away from the only relevant
question, which is whether or not the service of open gays undermines military
effectiveness. And on that question, the evidence is clear.
THE IMPORTANCE OF OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS
Is military effectiveness really what Elaine Donnelly cares about? Donnelly
accuses advocates of gays in the military of prioritizing “equal opportunity”
considerations above “the needs of the military,” herself adopting a political
rhetoric that, without any empirical evidence, posits a false tension between the
139
rights of gays and the effectiveness of the military.
Ironically, it is Donnelly
who elevates political and moral considerations above what is best for the
military.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 911.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 920.
Directive 1332.14, supra note 133.
Donnelly, supra note 1, at 929.
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Donnelly would have her readers believe that the military is strong and
hard, while she traffics in fears of its softness and vulnerability. In the opening
of her article, Constructing the Co-Ed Military, Donnelly worries about an
impending “disaster” akin to a fiery rocket explosion that threatens death and
140
destruction in a time of national security crisis. The “armed forces” she warns,
141
“are a prime venue for social engineering” and vulnerable to implosion from
within. She paints a picture of a dangerous cohort of civilian “social engineers”
who, she counsels, plan to test theories of “social construction” on unwitting
142
patriots.
Invoking the 1967 Apollo 1 explosion as her disaster narrative
analogy, she holds up NASA’s mechanical engineers as noble examples of “The
143
Importance of Objective Analysis,” who after initially ignoring early warning
signs (“communication problems, a ‘sour smell’ in the spacesuit loop, and a
sudden, unexplained rise in oxygen flow”) went on to challenge and objectively
144
reevaluate their basic assumptions leading to mission success with Apollo 8.
She suggests that, in contrast, irresponsible social engineers exercise “theoretical
145
146
hubris” and “stifle objective analysis.”
Though she attempts to galvanize her readers on the strength of their
citizenship duty to become guardians of the military institution, military
effectiveness is not really at the heart of what has Donnelly, the President of the
Center for Military Readiness, worried. For Donnelly, the military as an
institution is the guardian of society’s traditional male/female gender roles.
Women’s integration into the military appears to be the “sour smell” in her
disaster analogy, the early warning sign that signals gender trouble ahead,
opening the flood gates to what will destroy the military as a bastion of
masculinity and its attendant chivalric values: integration of gays in the military.
In the company of other social conservatives who echo these same fears often
147
verbatim, Donnelly believes the military should be a place that upholds what
she calls “civilized cultural values” and “Western cultural values and
148
civilization,” and by which she means a place where “good men protect and

140. Id. at 816−17.
141. Id. at 821.
142. Id. Donnelly uses the term “social engineers” throughout the essay. She invokes patriotism
in the first sentence in describing military culture: “All branches and communities have proud
histories, cultural traditions, and members motivated by patriotism as well as personal career goals,”
at 816.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 817.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 818.
147. R. Claire Snyder, “Patriarchal Militarism” at 266 (in Masters of War: Militarism and Blowback
in the Era of American Empire, edited by Carl Boggs [New York: Routledge, 2003]), cites Michell
Easton, president of the Clair Booth Luce Policy Institute warning of the dangers of the
“feminization of the military”: “If we continue to allow the social engineers, the feminists, and the
politicians to experiment with women in the military, our nation will not have the security and
preparation that it needs for the future” and WASHINGTON TIMES columnist Mona Charen similarly
warns, “The United States military exists to win wars, not to serve as the tool of a bunch of
feminists.”
148. Donnelly, supra note 1, at 930.
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King
defend women” and where “traditional chivalry” is not dead.
Arthur’s legendary court of Camelot was the seat of the most chivalrous knights
in the land and regarded as the pinnacle of civilized and chivalrous life. By
invoking chivalric values, Donnelly is participating in a neo-medieval
mythology that bemoans the passing of a by-gone era that never really existed
anywhere except in fable. Of course, Donnelly disregards the reality that the
United Kingdom, arguably once the seat of “Western Civilization” under the
British Empire, has adopted a policy of non-discrimination and allows gays and
lesbians to serve openly, in civilized co-existence.
Cloaking her essay and her Center in the trappings of concern for military
readiness, Donnelly presents a treatise against women’s civil equality and a
platform for advocating patriarchal values such as the gendered division of
labor and the protection of women. Donnelly hinges her arguments about the
co-ed military on her opposition to women, and especially mothers, in combat
roles. Her vehicle is the military, but her ultimate concern is society and the
construction of a so-called “family values” platform. It is in fact Donnelly
herself who appears to view the military as a site for social engineering, and she
worries that that project is failing.
In brief, she concedes that women have served effectively in support
150
roles, but maintains such situations, and the inescapable sexual tension of co151
ed environments, present a danger to women as well as to men in combat. She
relies on arguments from women’s physical inability to perform (“physical
152
burdens that lie beyond the capabilities of most women” ) to the class-based
argument that elite, career-oriented military women (a “few ambitious female
153
officers” ) seek combat roles to further advance their careers at the expense of
154
working-class enlisted women. She further collapses violence against women
in the military (rape, sexual assault, and specifically the infamous Tailhook
scandal) with the threat of mortal combat all soldiers face by viewing the pursuit
of the right of women to fight in the military as the promotion of “violence
155
against women.” Meanwhile, Donnelly tends to dismiss the validity of claims
of rape and sexual assault in the military by consistently putting the qualifier
156
“alleged” in front of references to “abuse” or “victims of sexual assault.” She
then labels policies that provide legal remedies for sex discrimination in the
157
workplace “double standards” that should be eliminated along with “quotas.”
For established scholars of women in the workplace, these are familiar code

149. Id. at 929–30.
150. Id. at 822.
151. Donnelly, supra note 1.
152. Id. at 835.
153. Id. at 854.
154. Id. at 853. Like Donnelly, Sandy Rios, the president of the Christian right group Concerned
Women for America, appeals to the stereotype of an elite core of ambitious career women willing to
place other women in danger for their own selfish gain: “This is no longer a power game where
ambitious female officers try to advance their careers. This is a matter of life and death.” Quoted in
R. Claire Snyder, Patriarchal Militarism at 266.
155. Elaine Donnelly, Constructing the Co-Ed Military, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 815 (2007)
156. Id. at 931.
157. Id. at 822.
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words that dismiss the existence of discriminatory practices, which such policies
are designed to address. Donnelly’s arguments involving the co-ed military, her
approach to gender equity, sexual harassment, workplace discrimination,
gender violence, and rape all have a greater societal resonance, just as she
intends.
Women will be our weak link, she argues, speculating that “terrorists who
are determined to create anarchy in Iraq by various means, including disruption
of the Iraqi/American Training Teams, could easily use cultural prejudice
against women and western culture to alienate male trainees who abjure
158
obedience to women.”
Or again, “International scandals involving sexual
harassment, misconduct, or allegations of sexual assault between male Iraqi
trainees and American women could be set off by provocative photos or
159
interviews broadcast worldwide.”
What is to blame for uniformed
misconduct at Abu Ghraib? Women in the military, she says, for in her eyes,
they are responsible for disrupting an otherwise professional environment, all
the while ignoring documented cases of abuse and misconduct that occur in
160
presumably all-male units.
Fallacies, such as the idea that women are
inherently disruptive of standards of military conduct, and that men are
incapable of complying with standards of conduct in the presence of women, are
what Donnelly considers the social costs of a co-ed military.
Among the other costs of a co-ed military that Donnelly points to are the
161
creation of separate accommodations for women and the formulating of
162
special concessions.
Submarines are her case-in-point as she summons a
vision of the special medical dangers inherent in women’s bodies. She imagines
163
what she calls “gynecological emergencies,” that “could endanger crew
members and undermine undersea missions. The only female sailors who could
safely be assigned to submarines,” she argues, “would be women without the
164
physical capability to have children.”
She worries about the possibility of
“birth defects to unborn fetus ‘passengers’ who accompany their mothers to
work on the sub.” In such baroque moments, Donnelly’s alliances are
transparent, relying as she does on the rhetoric of fetal iconicity used by groups
that oppose reproductive rights and women’s equality.
In general, her analysis of women, gender, and the military deserves
continued scrutiny as part of a larger discourse on women, the law, and society,
which is beyond the scope of the present essay. While the present essay focuses
on her critiques of the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy and the research that shows
that gays and lesbians do not negatively impact military effectiveness,
nonetheless, it should be noted that her own prevailing fears of how women’s

158. Id. at 852.
159. Id. at 853.
160.
See, for example, the Toledo Blade’s Pulitzer Prize reporting from 2003 on Vietnam era
atrocities
by
the
Tiger
Force
soldiers:
http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/section?Category=SRTIGERFORCE.
161. Donnelly, supra note 1 at 860.
162. Id. at 872.
163. Id. at 863.
164. Id. at 863.
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bodies may disrupt the delicate functioning of the military as a preserve of
traditional masculinity, are not unrelated to her anxiety about homosexuality
and homosexuals in the military. There is much more to be said about the
linkages between disaster narratives regarding women (and women’s bodies)
and anxiety over homosexuality (and especially male homosexual bodies) in
Donnelly’s rhetoric. Fear and regulation of female sexuality and homosexuality
operate as twin forces for the preservation and production of masculinity and
patriarchal values in military and civic life. And the specter of these twin
dangers are necessary for Donnelly to circumscribe women, restricting their
social roles to reproduction and limited forms of civic engagement. Donnelly’s
writing therefore weds “noisy homosexuals and feminist activists” as “social
engineers” of a cultural collapse figured by their perceived shared refusal of
165
reproductive norms.
In this, she sounds not unlike her nineteenth century
Victorian predecessors. Fearing the changes that women’s suffrage, the split
skirt, and the reform of marriage and property law would bring, they hailed the
New Woman along with the decadent homosexual as “twin apostles of social
166
apocalypse.”
There is little new or surprising in Donnelly’s thinking as a self-described
member of a cohort of conservative women who came of age under the tutelage
of Phyllis Schlafly.
Donnelly romantically describes hanging a framed
memento, a presidential campaign placard inscribed “Women for Reagan,” in
167
her home every Valentines Day.
Galvanized by their alienation from the
burgeoning women’s movement, Schlafly inspired this cohort to form an
opposition movement. The historic 1977 National Women’s Conference held in
Houston (the first and only national women’s conference to be sponsored by the
federal government), celebrating International Women’s Year, also marked a
watershed moment for anti-ERA counter-organizing. Feminist historians have
documented how specifically the idea of the conscription of women was used to
mobilize opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment and ultimately secure its
168
defeat.
What is surprising is that since then Donnelly has been able to craft
herself as an expert in all matters related to gender and the military and that she
is able to publish and disseminate unsubstantiated critiques of scholarly work.

165. Donnelly, Military Voters Due an Agenda for Change, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001.
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434, 447 (1979).
167. Donnelly, What Women Wanted, NAT’L REV ONLINE, June 7, 2004, http://www.nationalre
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(New York University Press 2000).

